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Disability and Welfare in South Africa’s 
Era of Unemployment and Aids 
Introduction 
South Africa’s welfare system is exceptional amongst middle-income and 
developing countries (Seekings, 2005b). It provides generous means-tested non-
contributory old-age pensions for the elderly, disability grants for those too ill 
or incapacitated to work, and child support grants for the care-givers of 
children. Approximately 10 million social grants are paid out each month, 
amounting to about 3% of the Gross Domestic Product. But despite this 
relatively generous level of social assistance, pressure on the welfare system 
continues to grow – most notably on disability grants which rose from about 
600,000 in 2000 to almost 1.3 million in 2004 (see also Nattrass, 2006).  
This is in part a consequence of the Aids epidemic. As can be seen in Figure 1, 
South Africa has one of the highest rates of HIV infection in the world.  
According to the ASSA2003 demographic model, by 2004, half a million new 
Aids sick cases were occurring each year.1 Many of these people were able to 
access disability grants. A recent analysis of a sample of disability grant files 
reported that the number of disability grants for people suffering from 
‘retroviral disease’ or who were ‘immuno-compromised’ rose from 27% in 
2001 to 41% in 2003 (CASE, 2005: 63). 
 However, Aids is not the only reason for the rapid take-up in disability grants.  
The increase was facilitated by institutional changes to the disability grant 
system that enabled local decision-makers to respond to growing pressure from 
citizens to use the disability grant in part as a form of poverty relief.  This 
pressure, in turn, is a consequence of South Africa’s high rate of unemployment 
(see Figures 1 and 2) and the absence of any social security for the 
unemployed.2 Unemployment is now the major driver of poverty and inequality 
(Seekings and Nattrass, 2005) – a situation exacerbated for many by the Aids 
                                                 
1 The ASSA model can be downloaded from the ASSA website: www.assa.org.za. 
2 There is some social insurance for the unemployed. The Unemployment Insurance Fund 
(UIF) provides income support for up to 36 weeks for those who have contributed to the fund 
who subsequently become unemployed. However, typically fewer than 5% of unemployed 
people receive UIF payments.   
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epidemic (Nattrass, 2004b). Given that the disability grant is the only social 
grant available to adults of working age, it is unsurprising that South Africa’s 
dual crisis of unemployment and Aids (see Figure 1) is resulting in a sharp 
increase in disability grants.         
Unemployment, HIV Prevalence and per capita Income for those countries with HIV 
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Figure 1: A Comparative Perspective on AIDS and Unemployment 
This poses a major challenge for South Africa’s welfare system:  should it 
continue to be based on the manifestly incorrect premise that all able bodied 
adults can support themselves through work; or should it be redesigned to 
address the large hole in the welfare net through which so many unemployed 
people are currently falling?  This paper argues that in light of the perverse 
incentives generated by the current system (which leaves many people choosing 
between income and health), wide-ranging changes are needed to the welfare 
system.  Building on earlier work (Nattrass, 2006), the paper argues that there is 
growing evidence that current disability policy is creating incentives for people 
to become and/or remain ill – and that this could be exacerbating the Aids 
epidemic and undermining the antiretroviral treatment rollout.   
There is also evidence of an emerging recognition on the part of local decision-
makers of the legitimacy of claims by poor people to improved levels of social 
security – especially for the unemployed.  Recent changes wrought by the 
national government to tighten up access to the disability grant, thus fly in the 
face of this emerging discourse of citizens rights. They are therefore likely to be 
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unpopular and will probably continue to be subverted by local decision-makers 
wherever possible. Rather than attempting to restrict access to social grants, a 
case is made for broadening access to the unemployed either by introducing an 
employment guarantee scheme (to provide jobs directly) or a basic income grant 
(to provide a minimum, unconditional, income to all citizens).   
The Disability Grant System 
As specified in the Social Assistance Act (Act 59 of 1992/Act 13 of 2004) 
individuals are eligible for a disability grant if they pass a means test and if, as a 
result of mental or physical disability, they are unable to provide for themselves 
through employment or professional activity. The grant is designed for 
working-aged adults3 under the clear expectation that those who are in principle 
capable of working should not be eligible. According to regulations issued by 
the national Minister of Social Development, a person is only eligible if the 
degree of his or her disability makes him or her incapable of entering a labour 
market. The applicant must not refuse to accept employment which is within his 
or her capabilities, or to receive treatment which may improve his or her 
condition. In other words, the grant is not designed to compensate people for 
their disabilities per se, but rather to compensate them for the impact of their 
disability on earning potential. That people may be able and desire to work, but 
unable to find it, is irrelevant to the legislation. But it appears not to have been 
irrelevant for all of those awarding disability grants between 2001 and 2004.     
There is evidence that the rapid take-up of disability grants between 2001 and 
2004 was facilitated by institutional changes to the grant awarding process and 
by sympathy on the part of at least some decision-makers towards using the 
grant to provide poverty-relief for applicants. The 2001 amendment (effective 
from December 2001) to the Social Assistance Act, empowered provinces to 
disestablish the role of the Pension Medical Officer (PMO), who previously had 
evaluated and adjudicated disability grant recommendations made by medical 
officers (MOs) thereby ensuring a degree of oversight and standardisation to the 
system.  The amendment gave provinces the choice of continuing with the old 
system, or replacing it with assessment panels (APs), whose members did not 
necessarily have to be medical doctors, or with a mixture of APs and MOs (see 
the Appendix for a summary of the different approaches adopted by the 
provinces). This move in the direction of ‘community-based’ targeting was 
                                                 
3 Disabled individuals below the age of 18 are eligible for child support grants (through their 
care-givers), and those who have reached pensionable age (60 for women, 65 for men) 
receive the old age pension rather than the disability grant. 
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Figure 2: National Strict Unemployment Rates (estimated from broadly comparative national labour force 
surveys) 
Dark (red) bars: Sub Saharan Africa 
Diagonally striped (green) bars: Latin America and the Caribbean 
Empty bars: Scandinavian social democracies and the new social democracies of Ireland and the Netherlands 
Horizontal (black) striped bars: Advanced capitalist liberal market economies 
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consistent with the growing recognition internationally, that given the 
complexity and high cost of disability targeting, that the community may be in a 
better position than bureaucrats to determine eligibility.4  However, it enabled 
‘social’ factors to be introduced into what the legislation envisaged should be a 
purely ‘medical’ decision.   
In 2004, the national Treasury commissioned a group of researchers from the 
Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) to determine the reasons behind 
the sharp increase in disability grants.  As part of this project, researchers 
visited selected sites in all provinces and spoke to a range of officials involved 
in the assessment and award of disability grants. They reported that poverty and 
unemployment were the most commonly cited reasons for the increase in the 
number of grants:  
“The perception that the disability grant is viewed as a form of 
poverty alleviation by both applicants and some involved in the 
assessment and approval process was almost universal, although 
interviewees differed in whether they were sympathetic to this 
interpretation or not” (CASE, 2005: 92).   
The research report includes a set of perceptive quotes and observations on this 
issue. For example, at Ongoye in KwaZulu-Natal, the clerks argued that poverty 
is rife in the area and that the disability grant is viewed as ‘igrant yokuhlupheka’ 
or ‘the grant for the poor people’, both by the general public and some involved 
in the assessment process. A provincial verification official from Xhariep in the 
Free State is reported as saying that “The problem is that people seem to think 
that if I do not have a job, then I can apply for the disability grant so that I can 
get some money to feed my family” (CASE, 2005: 92).  Officials told 
researchers that APs in KwaZulu-Natal and the North West province were 
sympathetic to the social plight of people and awarded grants to help them 
‘maintain themselves’.    
This growth in the number of disability grant recipients was not always seen as 
a problem by officials. A senior official in the Xhariep district office described 
the introduction of APs as “effective in that many people came into the system 
and that is an improvement that one would say the department has achieved in 
terms of bringing services to the people”.  He did observe, however, that the 
                                                 
4 See Mitra (2005: 20-21) on international recognition of the complexities and expense of 
disability targeting, and the advantages that community targeting may bring to the system. 
Responsibility for disability grants have been devolved to provincial/state level in Canada, 
and to municipal level in Sweden precisely to ensure that it is tailored to local conditions 
(Whiteworth et al, 2005). 
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department “did not have enough funds” for this (quoted in CASE, 2005: 93). A 
similar note was struck by an official from KwaZulu-Natal:  
“The disability grant, as the name indicates, should be based only on 
disablement. But somehow it becomes a bit difficult to ignore the 
socio-economic part… because people who are living in rural areas 
may not be working or do not necessarily have opportunities to work. 
But we don’t necessarily want to change the disability to be a basic 
income [grant]” (ibid: 94).   
The above quotes point to the ambiguity experienced by officials involved in 
the disability grant system at local levels: they see the need for greater social 
security, yet appreciate that the disability grant may not be the appropriate 
vehicle for it. At the same time, they appear to recognise (and appreciate) an 
emerging discourse of access to social grants as a right of citizens and an 
obligation of the state. According to the CASE report:    
“Interviewees also noted that in the context of high unemployment 
many people feel that the government has a responsibility to provide 
them with social assistance and that they are entitled to these grants. 
In some provinces this was blamed on the government’s ‘marketing’ 
of the social grants, which leads the public to believe that if they have 
no income they will be entitled to access assistance from the 
government. A senior verification official at the Bloemfontein 
provincial office remarked: ‘Is it not that people think [they can get 
the disability grant] because the government is saying that every 
person has the right to social security?’” (CASE, 2005: 95). 
This emerging interpretation of the rights of citizens to social assistance seems 
to have been assisted by the expansion of the number of Department of Social 
Development service points and by various awareness campaigns. As an official 
from the Northern Cape put it:  
“There are many people who are more aware of their rights. If you 
look at places like the old homeland states, those people never knew 
what a grant was. They only knew the old age grant. So as freedom 
came with education and the bill of rights and the necessary 
campaigns and imbizos of government, [that] made people to knock 
on government doors” (quoted in CASE: 2005: 95). 
In order to stop the disability grant from becoming a form of poverty 
alleviation, the CASE report recommended a narrow set of managerial solutions 
including the adoption of standardised assessment tools and clear uniform 
eligibility criteria, the simplification of the means test and its enforcement for 
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every applicant, and better education of frontline staff about the rules of 
disability grant management (CASE, 2005: 119-20).  Such recommendations 
were consistent with the letter and spirit of many reforms that had already taken 
place in 2004 to reduce the growth in disability grants. These included the 
scrapping of APs and/or the sharp curtailment of the discretionary powers of 
local officials (see the appendix for more detail).   
The problem with this policy response is two-fold. Firstly, it does nothing to 
address the social roots of the growth in disability grants – i.e. unemployment, 
poverty and Aids. Secondly, it is blind to the complex reasons why many local-
level MOs and/or APs, responding to local conditions, awarded large numbers 
of disability grants as soon as the system provided the flexibility to allow it. 
Although this resulted in policy variation within the country (something which 
neither the CASE researchers nor the national Treasury approved of), it had the 
advantage of being responsive to local conditions and social attitudes. The new 
measures are thus likely to lack legitimacy and will probably continue to be 
subverted by sympathetic MOs and other local officials.  
A possible response to this would be to tighten the rules yet further and 
introduce another layer of bureaucrats to check local officials. This, however, 
could raise costs substantially.  For example, in the USA, where successful 
applicants have to survive a rigorous ‘five step disability test’, disability 
payments comprise only 15% of total social security benefit payments, yet 
account for 45% of the administrative costs (Mitra, 2005: 19-20).  Reducing the 
number of beneficiaries in this way will thus come at the (deadweight) cost of a 
more bloated bureaucracy whilst doing nothing to address the underlying 
problem of inadequate social assistance for the unemployed.  Furthermore, it 
will do nothing to address the perverse incentives created by the system for 
people to become and remain ill/disabled.  
Perverse Incentives to Become and Remain Ill 
or Disabled 
Given South Africa’s high unemployment rates and relatively generous 
disability grants, illness has itself become an important source of income 
(Nattrass, 2006). This reality is reflected in the following quote from a MO in a 
tuberculosis (TB) clinic in the Western Cape:  
“In my experience, the majority of the patients are really coming 
mainly because they are unemployed and not so much because of 
illness. It seems sometimes to me that developing TB is a kind of a 
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blessing for some of them, that they now stand a chance of getting a 
grant” (quoted in CASE, 2005: 93).   
The problem with this, of course, is that if illness is a much desired ticket to a 
grant, then this may well undermine adherence to the treatment required to cure 
(or manage) the illness.  A MO from the Northern Cape complained of precisely 
this with regard to TB patients: “People won’t take their tablets… because they 
want to stay on the system. Poverty is in such a proportion that people will do 
things that could kill them to get the grant” (ibid).  
The same problem is evident with regard to Aids. There are reports that people 
may be attempting to become HIV-positive in order to get the disability grant 
(see Nattrass, 2006, Leclerc-Madlala, 2005).  The fact that until late 2004, the 
North-west province allocated disability grants to people simply on the basis of 
being HIV-positive may have contributed to this problem. Since then, provincial 
policy towards Aids-related disability grants has been standardising around a 
medical model which restricts disability grants to those who are Aids-sick (i.e. 
in the final stages of the illness – usually understood to occur when a patient’s 
CD4 cell count drops below 200 cells per millilitre of blood).5  This means that 
being HIV-positive is not enough, people must be deemed to be suffering from 
Aids.  This, in turn, has created incentives for people to become ill.  In this 
regard, a representative of the National Association of People with Aids 
(NAPWA), has been quoted as saying that HIV-positive people who had not yet 
become ‘sick enough’ to qualify for the disability grant start ‘neglecting 
themselves’ in order to ‘qualify for government grants to put bread on the 
table’.6 He went on to argue for job creation for HIV-positive people. This 
highlights, once again, the growing desperation amongst adults of working age 
who cannot access social assistance – and the enormous pressure that this is 
placing on the disability grant as a consequence.  
As discussed in Nattrass (2006), this problem is also potentially serious with 
regard to the antiretroviral (ARV) treatment rollout.  ARV treatment has the 
effect of restoring a person’s immune system thereby facilitating a rebound in 
their CD4 cell counts.  As their health improves, they therefore no longer 
qualify for the disability grant.  This is entirely consistent with the underlying 
premise of South Africa’s welfare system – i.e. that only those too sick to work 
should be provided with social assistance.  As the ARV rollout progresses 
through the country, more and more people will lose their disability grants.  It 
                                                 
5 Leclerc-Madlala reports that a Durban hospital has decided to support applications for 
disability grants only for those patients whose CD4 counts are below 50 in order to ‘stem the 
rising tide of patients seeking grant certificates’ (2005: 6). 
6 Quoted in HIV/Aids News no.126, 15/7/05, available on www.learnscapes.co.za 
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has been estimated that by 2010, more people will be losing their disability 
grants through restored health than will be gaining access to them (ibid). 
This is likely to cause severe economic hardship to households that had 
previously relied on the grant (ibid) as well as undermine the food security and 
health of people on ARV therapy.  According to Dr Khumalo (Rob Ferreira 
Hospital in Mpumalanga): 
“It does not help that the government takes away the grant once a 
person becomes better on treatment. Personally, I don’t approve 
because most people on antiretrovirals are poor and they need the 
grant to survive. With the grant they are able to buy basic food that is 
necessary to complement antiretroviral treatment.  After the twelve 
month deadline of the grant expires, patients start to become 
depressed and they start developing side effects to their treatment 
since most of them have to take their medication on an empty 
stomach. Without the grant you find that the patient’s CD4 counts 
drop and they start becoming very ill again” (quoted in Equal 
Treatment, December 2005: 11) 
Anecdotal evidence from patients and doctors suggests that some individuals 
may opt to stop adhering to their antiretroviral therapy in order to increase their 
viral loads and reduce their CD4 cell counts in order to re-qualify for the 
disability grant (Leclerc-Madlala, 2005; Nattrass, 2006). A recent Aids 
Consortium meeting of representatives of close to 100 organisations dealing 
with HIV/Aids from Limpopo and Gauteng highlighted the poverty-alleviating 
aspect of the disability grant and reported that people were indeed refusing to 
adhere to antiretroviral therapy “because they are scared that their CD4 count 
will improve and they will lose the grant” (McCalla-Kay, 2005). The report 
noted that some people would “rather die of Aids than lose the disability grant” 
(ibid).  
That people are considering trading off their health in order to obtain access to a 
disability grant is an act of terrible desperation. It reflects the enormous problem 
of poverty and unemployment in a context where the only form of social 
assistance for able-bodied adults is the disability grant. No wonder, then, that 
many APs and MOs between 2001 (when greater discretion was facilitated by 
institutional changes) and late 2004 (when greater controls were imposed in all 
provinces) felt compelled to consider the socio-economic environment facing 
disability grant applicants when making their recommendations for disability 
grants. This was not simply a matter of them adopting a rival ‘social’ model of 
disability over the managerially neater (and fiscally cheaper) ‘medical’ model – 
it almost certainly also reflects the fact that medical approaches to illness could 
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not be isolated from the social context.  Discussion of policy options needs to be 
cognisant of this reality. 
Towards Policy Reform 
All welfare systems are predicated to some extent on the duty of individuals to 
work, the idea being that welfare should function as a safety net, rather than as 
an alternative to work. However, welfare systems differ in terms of the level of 
welfare support and in terms of the policing mechanisms they put in place to 
ensure that the so-called ‘undeserving’ do not access social assistance.   
In developed economy welfare systems, people of working age are either 
assisted to find employment, or have access to social security either in the form 
of income support for the unemployed (or if they are disabled, in the form of 
disability grants).  The underlying assumption is that adults of working age 
should be productively engaged, and where possible should contribute to social 
insurance schemes to provide for their own retirement, disability, and periods of 
unemployment. Social assistance from the state is targeted specifically at those 
who have been unable to contribute to social insurance schemes or whose 
benefits from such schemes have proved inadequate (e.g. for long periods of 
unemployment). Social assistance is typically means-tested and in many 
countries is increasingly dependent on participation in labour-market 
programmes designed to improve the employability of grant recipients and to 
assist them in finding work.  This approach has been made easier by buoyant 
economic conditions in the advanced capitalist countries and by specific labour-
market reforms to boost employment.  
By contrast, most developing countries do not have such comprehensive welfare 
nets.  Instead, they rely on people being able to earn an income through 
employment (whether in the formal or informal economy, or in the agrarian 
sector) and being supported by their kin (Seekings, 2005b). Over the past two 
decades, urbanisation, de-agrarianisation and a declining capacity to absorb new 
labour-market entrants into formal employment has posed challenges for many 
developing country welfare regimes. Some, like Mexico, opted to boost 
employment through labour-demanding growth strategies (including flexible 
labour market policies) and by supporting the incomes of the poor through a set 
of targeted programmes (Whitworth et al, 2005: 10-16; Mitra, 2005: 29-30). 
Others have opted to introduce more ‘workfare’ oriented policies. Such 
countries included India, which expanded the Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(previously limited to Maharashtra) to the entire country (Bagchee, 2005; 
Seekings, 2005a: 4-6); Ethiopia, where social assistance in the form of food aid 
is conditional on participation in public works programmes; only those too sick 
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to work are allocated free food aid (Quisimbing and Yohannes, 2005) and 
Argentina and South Korea (which introduced massive public works 
programmes to cope with economic crisis (Seekings 2005a: 5).    
In neither the developed nor developing economy welfare regimes do the 
disabled have an incentive to become or remain disabled.  In developed 
economy welfare regimes people are provided support if they are poor, 
unemployed and want to work, or too disabled to work (see Figure 3). There is 
no hole in the welfare net.  Most developing countries target the poor in general 
(rather than the disabled in particular) and place great importance on promoting 
income-earning opportunities.  There is thus no incentive built into these 
welfare systems for the poor to become disabled, or to prevent themselves from 
becoming cured of their disabilities. South Africa is one of only a few 
developing countries that provide a disability grant7 – but it has done so in a 
context in which there is little or no support for the unemployed, thus resulting 
in a set of perverse incentives to become or remain disabled.  
 
 
Figure 3:  Labour Market Participation and the Disabled Adult 
One option is for South Africa to scrap the disability grant system altogether. 
However this would be unethical and unpopular (as public opinion in South 
Africa seems to be supportive of the disability grant (Seekings, 2005c)). 
Another option would be to provide special labour-market programmes for 
                                                 
7 Others include for example Namibia, Mauritius, Argentina, Barbados, the Bahamas, Brazil, 
Costa Rica and Bermuda (Mitra, 2005: 16). 
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those losing their disability grants as a result of restored health (i.e. providing 
support for a right-ward shift in Figure 3).  The state could, for example, 
introduce specially targeted job creation schemes or provide tax incentives for 
firms to provide preferential employment for such individuals. The problem 
with this option is two-fold: it is expensive and administratively complex; and it 
is unfair. Other unemployed people could justifiably ask why those who had 
previously benefited from a disability grant are given preferential treatment. 
Such a situation could exacerbate the existing perverse incentive to become 
disabled.   
Alternatively, the state could improve the left-ward shift options outlined in 
Figure 3, and provide social support for the previously disabled unemployed. 
This could, perhaps, take the form of a reduced disability grant for those whose 
health has improved, but who cannot find a job. In the case of Aids-patients, 
this could perhaps be called a ‘treatment-support grant’, which although lower 
in value to the disability grant, would serve to provide some poverty-relief. But, 
like the preferential or targeted labour-market support, such policies may be 
perceived as unfair by those who never had access to the disability grant in the 
first place. And, once it became known that people with Aids were able to 
access a disability grant when they were ill, and then a ‘treatment support grant’ 
once they were on treatment (and had their health restored), this could 
exacerbate the perverse incentive to become HIV-positive. 
In short, there are compelling reasons for the government to reconsider the 
structure of the entire welfare system if it is to address the problems currently 
posed by the disability grant. Crucially, it needs to address the incentive 
problems posed by the mismatch between the premise of full employment and 
the reality on the ground.  
The most obvious policy response is to boost the rate of job creation.  This, 
however, will not be easy.  Despite relatively rapid economic growth since 2000 
(the economy is growing at 4.5%, i.e. its fastest since the boom years of the 
1960s), unemployment rates have barely changed since 2000.8 Although there 
has been some improvement in the rate of job creation since 1995, much of this 
has is a statistical artefact (resulting from measurement changes) or driven by 
the expansion of low-earning, low-productivity informal sector activities 
(Casale et al (2004). The fact that the expansion in formal jobs has been so 
sluggish in response to rapid economic growth indicates that South Africa’s 
long-standing employment problem is likely to remain intractable in the short- 
to medium-term.  This is in part a consequence of South Africa’s economic 
structure, and in part a consequence of resistance on the part of South Africa’s 
                                                 
8 In September 2000 and March 2005, the percentage of the workforce actively seeking 
employment was 25.4% and 26.5% respectively. 
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trade unions to labour-market reforms (Nattrass, 2004a; Seekings and Nattrass, 
2005).   
Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) 
Another possible response is for the government to deliver jobs directly through 
an Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) such as that in the Indian state of 
Maharashtra, now recently expanded to the whole of India (see Bagchee, 2005; 
Pellissary, 2005). Although the South African government supports the idea of 
‘massive’ public works programmes as its preferred policy response to 
unemployment, this has been more of a rhetorical commitment than a reality. 
The Community Based Public Works Program of 2002/3 was able to provide 
only 1% of the number of work days demanded by South Africa’s unemployed, 
and the Expanded Public Works Programme (initiated in April 2004 to improve 
the labour-intensity of infrastructure provision) is unlikely to do any better.9   
In short, if public works programmes are to succeed in making a significant dent 
on unemployment, a major increase in managerial10 and financial resources is 
required.  However, as is the case with promoting labour-demanding economic 
growth, this task will remain hampered by wage-setting institutions. Mean 
wages paid by the Gundu Lashu infrastructural project in the Limpopo province 
of South Africa are five times higher than that available on the Indian EGS and 
double the earnings in South African subsistence agriculture (Seekings (2005c) 
and McCord (2004)). This has resulted in some disruption of local labour 
markets (81% of workers on the scheme reported giving up or reducing 
alternative work) and in poor targeting (as only 19% of job opportunities went 
to previously unemployed individuals). If wages continue to be set at (or close 
to) industrial sector minima, the number of employment opportunities created 
will be constrained and poorly targeted at those who need them.   
Such institutional constraints on the implementation of an extensive pro-poor 
public works programme suggest that South Africa may have to address the 
problem of unemployment and poverty by plugging the hole in the welfare net 
by other means. This could be done through the introduction of targeted social 
assistance for the unemployed (a ‘dole’). The downside of this proposal is that 
additional financial and human resources would need to be deployed to manage 
such a new means-tested grant and to prevent fraudulent claims. This task 
                                                 
9 See McCord (2003) and McCord and Van Seventer (2004).  
10 Non wage costs of public works programmes are likely to be at least 27% of total 
expenditure, as has historically been the case in the Maharashtra EGS (Dev, 1995) and 
possibly as high as 48%, which was the average non-wage cost of the South African public 
works program implemented between 1992-98 (McCord, 2003: 18).  
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would be made all the more difficult by the fact that unlike the disability grant 
(which requires documented assessment of disability) or the old-age pension 
(which is linked to age as well as income), the labour-market status of people 
describing themselves as unemployed will be difficult to prove and monitor 
over time.   
A possible solution to this problem would be to go down the route of Indian 
‘workfare’, where the State guarantees each household 100 days of low-wage 
employment, and if in the unusual event of there being insufficient work 
opportunities, the state is required to pay the wage as a grant.  In the 
Maharashtra EGS, the grant was never paid but rather its potential claim by 
villagers petitioning the state for employment to be provided in their area was 
sufficient to embarrass the state into providing the necessary jobs (Bagchee, 
2005). As Bagchee, points out, the system was successful precisely because it 
was politicised at every level, with villagers expressing voice through village 
structures which were subsequently successfully channelled to those responsible 
for providing employment projects on demand.11 Given South Africa’s massive 
unemployment problem and the major challenges entailed in improving local 
government structures and providing work opportunities for all, the introduction 
of an EGS in South Africa would, at least in the short-term, almost certainly 
result in the payment of a substantial number of grants. This would inevitably 
result in poor targeting, because it is only once low-wage employment comes on 
line, that only the very poor (i.e. those prepared to work for low wages) become 
self-targeted.    
What would this cost? As of March 2005, there were 4.3 million unemployed 
people actively seeking work. The number of unemployed rises to 8.1 if we 
include in the definition of the unemployed those who say they want work but 
are not actively seeking it. Let us assume that the government introduces a low-
wage employment guarantee scheme paying R20 a day (a wage which is over 
three times that paid on Indian job guarantee schemes) for a maximum of 100 
days a year and that 75% of the active job seekers queue up to demand this 
work. The total wage bill will amount to R6.45 billion.  If we assume that the 
administrative and managerial costs double the costs of the programme, then the 
government would have to find an extra total of R12.9 billion a year to fund a 
job guarantee scheme. If 75% of the broadly defined unemployed demand work, 
then the costs would rise to R24.3 billion a year.  In other words, depending on 
take-up, the cost of a low-wage job guarantee scheme would cost between 1.1% 
and 1.8% of GDP, and would require an increase in the tax-take of between 3-
7%.  Note, however, that if labour-market and economic policy reforms were 
                                                 
11 Pellissery (2005), however, cautions that the political mobilisation was not always in the 
best interests of the poor as there was potential for political elites to control access to jobs, 
and to direct the creation of productive assets through the program to private interests.  
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implemented to encourage the growth of labour-intensive employment, then the 
numbers of unemployed will fall, and the number of tax payers would rise, 
thereby reducing and spreading the tax burden associated with an EGS.  And, if 
the value of existing welfare grants were reduced, this would also reduce the 
pressure on the fiscus.  
A Basic Income Grant (BIG) 
The alternative to such a ‘workfare’ or targeted welfare policy interventions for 
the unemployed is to opt for a universal, non-conditional BIG that is paid to all 
citizens. This idea was proposed by the government’s Taylor Committee (2002), 
supported by academics,12 and promoted by a wide range of civil society 
organisations ‘the BIG coalition’.  A BIG has the advantage of being 
administratively efficient as no means test, nor test of employment status needs 
to be administered (as would be the case with the introduction of a 
unemployment-linked social assistance) and nor would additional government 
resources need to be mobilised to provide employment opportunities for the 
poor (as would be the case with an EGS).  Seekings points out, as the state: 
“already delivers ten million grants every month, increasingly making 
use of computerized banking technologies. Introducing a basic 
income grant would double the welfare budget and entail between 
four and five times as many payments per month, but this challenge 
would be minor compared to that of implementing massive public 
works programmes” (2005a: 22).  
The downside of a BIG is that the government is opposed to it and public 
opinion seems to favour the allocation of social assistance to the ‘deserving’ 
poor more than it favours universal grants which are seem as being paid to the 
(undeserving) rich and poor alike (Seekings, 2005c).13 Of course the 
introduction of a BIG can be highly targeted and redistributive if linked to a 
simultaneous increase in value-added tax (VAT) – but this is a complex 
argument to put across to the average citizen. Le Roux (2003) has shown that a 
BIG of R100 a month to all citizens would cost R54 billion a year – but that 
most of this could be ‘clawed back’ if VAT was increased by 7 percentage 
points, resulting in a net additional cost of R15 billion a year. His calculations 
suggest that people who spend less than R1,000 a month will be net 
beneficiaries of the BIG, and all those rich enough to spend more than R1000 a 
                                                 
12 See articles in the edited collection by Standing and Samson (2003). 
13 For example, a representative survey of Cape Town found that over 80% of respondents 
agreed that the government should do more to help the unemployed, but less smaller 
majorities (less than 60%) supported the introduction of a BIG (Seekings, 2005d: 10).  
 16
month will pay more in VAT than they benefit from the BIG. Such a tax-
financed BIG would thus be highly redistributive, but would require that VAT 
rises to the levels found in Kenya and Tanzania. It is also likely to be resisted by 
those groups (including most unionised workers) whose monthly expenditures 
exceed R1,000 a month (Matisonn and Seekings, 2003).  
Managing Disability in the Context of an EGS 
or a BIG 
Whether South Africa opts for targeted social assistance for the unemployed, or 
an EGS or a BIG – there is a strong case for addressing the large hole in South 
Africa’s welfare net. Not only will it address the problem of poverty 
experienced by many unemployed people, but it will help reduce the perverse 
incentive built into the current system for people to become or remain 
ill/disabled.  However, if the income gap between the disability grant and these 
new forms of support for the unemployed remains large, then the incentive 
problem may not disappear altogether.   
Table 1 explores the impact of the loss of a disability grant on a hypothetical 
grant-dependent household. In the current policy context, the loss of a disability 
grant results in a 100% drop in income for the disability grant recipient, and a 
40% decrease in household income. If the loss of the disability grant occurred in 
the context of an EGS offering R20 a day for 100 days per year to the 
unemployed (i.e. an average monthly income of R167), then not only would the 
household be better off to start with, but the drop in personal income for the 
disability grant recipient would be smaller (R613 as opposed to R780) and 
household income would fall by only 27.2%.  A similar cushioning effect is 
evident if the loss of the disability grant takes place in the context of a BIG.    
In other words, if other forms of social assistance were available to other 
members of the household in the form of a BIG or an EGS, then the loss of 
disability grant income is less severe for total household income – and there will 
thus be less pressure on people to undermine their health in order to access 
disability grant income.  However, the fall in personal income as a consequence 
of the cancellation of the disability grant is still substantial. This is a 
consequence of the relatively generous levels of social grants in South Africa.   
As South Africa already allocates a much greater share of GDP to social grants 
than any other middle-income or developing country, consideration should 
probably be given to reducing the value of existing grants when expanding 
coverage to repair the hole in the welfare net. Although reducing the value of 
grants will not be popular because existing grants comprise such an important 
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share of household income for the poor, if this is accompanied by the 
introduction of new grants or income opportunities which more than make up 
for the loss in value of existing grants, then the measure will be easier to sell 
politically. The final column of Table 1 shows the impact of the loss of a 
disability grant in the context of an EGS and a 10% reduction in the value of 
existing social grants. In this scenario, household income falls by 26% as a 
consequence of the loss of disability grant income, and the disability grant 
recipient experiences a decline of R535 rather than the R780 which is currently 
the case. Reducing the value of existing social grants thus has the benefit of 
freeing up 0.3% of GDP (which could finance between 17% and 27% of the 
resources needed for an EGS) as well as reducing the trade-off between income 
and health substantially. 















Disability grant recipient R 780 R 780 R 780 R 702 
Unemployed adult R 0 R 167 R 100 R 167 
Unemployed adult R 0 R 167 R 100 R 167 
Non-labour force participant R 0 R 0 R 100 R 0 
Child of qualifying age for the child support grant R 180 R 180 R 180 R 162 
Child of qualifying age for the child support grant R 180 R 180 R 180 R 162 
Child not of qualifying age for the child support 
grant 
R 0 R 0 R 100 R 0 
Old age pensioner R 780 R 780 R 780 R 702 
Total household income R 1,920 R 2,254 R 2,320 R 2,062 
Total household income minus disability grant R 1,140 R 1,474 R 1,540 R 1,360 
New income source for previously disabled 
individual 
R 0 R 167 R 100 R 167 
Total household income following the loss of the 
disability grant 
R 1,140 R 1,641 R 1,640 R 1,527 
Absolute drop in household income as a result of 
the loss of a the disability grant 
R 780 R 613 R 680 R 535 
% drop in household income 40.6% 27.2% 29.3% 25.9% 
Note: If a person works 100 days at R20 a day, this amounts to R2,000 a year – i.e. an average of R167 a month. 
The discussion so far has sought to address the problem of perverse incentives 
to become or remain disabled by discussing policies designed to narrow the 
income differential between the disabled and non-disabled adults. An alternative 
approach is to address the problem by changing the way that disability grants 
are administered – especially those for people with long-term chronic conditions 
which could be managed successfully with treatment.   
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One could, for example, address the problem of people choosing not to comply 
with their medication by requiring proof of compliance with treatment 
regimens.  This appears to be the emerging policy stance in the Eastern Cape 
and the North West Province – see Appendix. However, short of the kind of 
‘directly observed therapy’ (DOT) policy whereby patients have to take their 
medication in the presence of a witness, treatment adherence is impossible to 
monitor in any fool-proof manner. Pill counts can be subverted and clinical 
markers (such as falling CD4 counts in the case of patients with Aids) are not 
always indicative of non compliance. For example, CD4 counts may fall 
because the patient stopped taking his or her medication, or they could fall 
because of emerging drug resistance, thus indicating that the patient needs to 
change drug regimens. Certainly in the case of antiretroviral treatment, attempts 
to enforce adherence through coercive measures are likely to be resource-
intensive and unlikely to succeed. Addressing the root of the problem – i.e. the 
need for income on the part of the person on treatment – is almost certainly 
preferable.   
In the scenario sketched in Table 1, a person becoming well enough to work 
(and hence no longer eligible for the disability grant) at least has the prospects 
of earning an average of R167 per month through the EGS. Officials managing 
the EGS should be sensitive to the needs and capacities of people living on 
antiretroviral treatment (they have to attend clinics regularly and may not be 
able to perform heavy manual labour) and be required to offer appropriate jobs 
to people on antiretroviral therapy. If no appropriate jobs are available, then (as 
would be the case in any job centre which cannot provide work to those 
demanding it), the applicant for the EGS should be awarded a cash grant 
equivalent to the average monthly earnings on the programme (R167 in Table 1) 
until appropriate work can be found.   
Conclusion 
In sum, there are two ways to address the problems facing South Africa’s 
disability grant system.  The first is to adopt a managerial solution by 
developing stricter guidelines for eligibility. This will probably restrict the 
numbers of people accessing disability grants (although local officials will no 
doubt continue to impose local interpretations of the rules). More importantly, it 
will put a lid on the number of grants (at the cost of considerable hardship for 
many poor households) and will do nothing to address the perverse incentives 
associated with the disability grant. This could well undermine the success of 
the antiretroviral treatment programme and undermine other disease 
management programmes, such as that for TB.   
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The second option is to address the root cause of the problem: i.e. repair the 
hole in South Africa’s welfare net. This could be done through the introduction 
of a grant for the unemployed (a ‘dole’), or an EGS or a BIG. The biggest 
problem with a grant for the unemployed is that it is administratively difficult to 
determine which individuals are really unemployed – i.e. would be prepared to 
work if offered a job.  An EGS has the advantage of self-targeting the poor 
unemployed (only those prepared to work at low wages will take advantage of 
the job opportunities). For this to work, however, wages would need to be low, 
and there may well be opposition from organised labour to this.  Another 
challenge for the EGS is developing the institutional capacity at local level to 
provide jobs on demand. A BIG has the advantage of providing universal cover, 
and is administratively easier. However, the government’s opposition to a BIG 
remains an important obstacle.  
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Appendix:  Provincial Differences in Disability Grant Policy and Trends 
Province 
(% of total 
disability 











0% PMOs stopped in 2001. APs not introduced. Decisions made by MOs alone until April 2004 when a medical 
assessment unit was introduced and District Medical Officers appointed. Guidelines introduced in August 2004 (person 
must be significantly impaired and if treatment is available, provide documentary evidence of treatment compliance). 
Free State 
(8.6%) 
7% PMOs stopped in 2001. Continued using MOs with APs (until Sept 2004), now MOs only.  No guidelines for 
HIV/AIDS until late 2004. 
Gauteng 
(12.9%) 
0% PMOs stopped in 2002. Continued using MOs (no APs introduced). Guidelines updated in 2003 to include specific 
reference to HIV/AIDS (criteria of not being able to work introduced). 
KwaZulu-Natal 
(25.7%) 
21% PMOs stopped in 2001.  Parallel use of APs and MOs until 2004 (now MOs only).  As of August 2004, MOs have to 
sign that they are complying with  eligibility regulations. 
Limpopo 
(7.6%) 
78% PMOs stopped.  As of 2002, a MO does the assessment, the AP (based in hospitals) makes the recommendation, and 
the Head of Social Security makes the final decision. A person must not be able to compete in the open labour market. 
People with chronic illness usually given temporary disability grants and reviewed after 12 months. 
Mpumulanga 
(5.4%) 
92% APs work with MOs. Final decision made by PMO or district head. No clear guidelines. 
Northern Cape 
(3.2%) 




95% MOs used for assessment, APs make the recommendation and the provincial office makes the final decision.  Up to 
October 2004, just being HIV+ was sufficient for a grant. Now recipients have to be in Stage 3 or 4.  People with 




0% PMOs stopped. Eligibility determined by a MO who decides whether a person is able to work or not.  HIV+ people 




Note: * Calculated from sample of disability grant records (CASE, 2005: 61-64). 
Source: Simkins, 2005; CASE, 2005: 19-24, 29, 42, 61-4.  
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As summarised in the above table, the provinces adopted different approaches, 
with only two retaining the services of a PMO (the Northern Cape maintained 
the old system, and Mpumulanga required that either a PMO or an official from 
the Department of Social Security make the final decision). The other provinces 
left the award decision to the discretion of MOs or APs.  The Eastern Cape, the 
Western Cape and Gauteng chose not to introduce APs. Others introduced a 
mixture of APs and MOs (KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumulanga, Free State, Limpopo), 
but to varying extents. The Free State and Northern Cape piloted the AP system, 
but discarded it soon thereafter. KwaZulu Natal introduced the AP system 
widely, but suspended all the APs in August 2004.  In Limpopo, APs were 
located in hospitals and made up of health professionals, in the North West 
Province and Mpumulanga, they were linked to social security offices. In 
KwaZulu Natal, which experienced the most rapid growth in the number of 
disability grants, it appears that APs included a wider variety of community 
involvement and in the opinion of local officials.    
The provinces adopted different approaches to HIV/Aids-related disability. Up 
until October 2004, the North West province allocated disability grants simply 
on the basis of being HIV-positive but now requires that people have to be in 
clinical Stage 3 or 4, that they (like other people with chronic illness) be 
expected to go for treatment, and that they should only be allocated temporary 
disability grants that get reviewed after 12 months.  Gauteng (from April 2003) 
and Limpopo require HIV-positive people be too sick to work to qualify – as 
does the Western Cape (which also requires that people be in stage 3 or 4 of 
AIDS). The Northern Cape and Mpumulanga have not produced any guidelines 
on this matter, leaving it up to the relevant MO. Initially, the Eastern Cape left if 
up to the discretion of MOs, but since August 2004 has produced guidelines 
requiring that people with chronic illness be significantly impaired and provide 
documented evidence of treatment compliance (where treatment is available). 
KwaZulu-Natal similarly introduced guidelines in August 2004.   
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